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LIFTING THE EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
USING VIETNAM AS A MODEL: A POLICY
PAPER FOR MODERNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last thirty-eight years, the United States has im-
posed full trade embargoes upon Cuba and Vietnam. For eco-
nomic, political, and moral reasons, the United States took the
extreme measure of halting all trade with these countries and
effectively stopped others from doing business with them as
well.' Both countries were Communist at the time of sanction-
ing, and both countries remain Communist today, yet only the
Cuban embargo continues.2
During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy towards Commu-
nist countries, and Communism in general, was openly ad-
versarial.3 American strategy regarding Communist govern-
ments was to engage in a constant barrage of anti-Communist
exercises (a trade embargo being just one such example) to
force an end to Communist ideology in many third-world na-
tions.4 In retaliation, to this strategy, Communist superpowers
supplied money, arms and other goods to burgeoning Socialist
1. The reasons and ramifications for each embargo are vast. For detailed
discussions of the histories of the tensions between the United States and the two
countries, see infra Sections II, III, IV, and V.
2. In 1963, the United States imposed a full trade embargo against Cuba.
See generally Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Actions Needed for Lifting the U.S. Trade
Embargo Against Cuba, 3 U. MIm Y.B. INT' L. 53 (1995) (discussing in detail
the intricacies of the American embargo against Cuba). In 1975, after the fall of
Saigon, the United States imposed a full trade embargo against Vietnam. See gen-
erally Ky Tran-Trong, Note, A Would Be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam's Prospects for
Gaining Most Favored Nation Status, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1583 (1997) (ex-
plaining the technicalities of the embargo against Vietnam and the strategies im-
plemented by the United States and Vietnam to end the embargo).
3. See generally Yonkel Goldstein, The Failure of Constitutional Controls Over
War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argument For a Constitutional Amendment,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1543 (1988); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989) (discussing, by both authors, the U.S. policies
regarding the Communist "threat" and the strategies implemented by various ad-
ministrations to deal with the perceived threat).
4. See Yen D. Chu, Note, The Making of a Quagmire: The Inadequacies of
Applying the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Vietnam's Transitional Economy, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 453, 459 (1997).
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governments throughout the world.5 Apart from the former
Soviet Union and China, Vietnam and Cuba took advantage of
this policy, impacting on the U.S. psyche.' Twice during this
period, the United States acted aggressively against a per-
ceived "threat" of Communism: the Cuban Missile Crisis which
brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of
nuclear war, and the Vietnam War which cost the lives of
56,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese.7
Generally, military action has been the last resort for the Unit-
ed States, but instead the United States has preferred the
more common, and more internationally acceptable strategy of
implementing trade embargoes.'
Two such embargoes-against Cuba and Vietnam-are
examples of U.S. foreign policy being implemented without
military force.9 There is evidence that embargoes are success-
ful, as demonstrated by the decision to lift the U.S. embargo
against Vietnam in 1994. That embargo was removed only
after the United States and Vietnam had negotiated methods
and strategies for normalization of relations, and Vietnam
demonstrated its willingness to ease its hard-line stance on
many key issues."0 Today, trade relations and diplomatic ties
between the United States and Vietnam are being further
normalized in the hopes by both countries that U.S. entrepre-
5. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 1426.
6. Id. at 1417.
7. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1548, 1558.
8. See U.N. CHARTER chs. VI-VII: "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and "Ac-
tion with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression," in which the methods and strategies are discussed for parties to the
Charter to settle disputes. A principle that resounds throughout the Charter and
international law in general is that settlement of disputes should be carried out
pacifically whenever possible.
9. U.S. citizens may file claims against foreign governments for expropriated
property under 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645 (1990). This statutory scheme results from
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), a branch of the Department of
Justice that follows a statutory procedure to determine the amount and validity of
claims against a foreign government. The FCSC was an integral part of the In-
ternational Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 12 (1950) (codified as amended
in 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1625 (1990)), which was enacted out of a "growing concern of
the United States regarding violations by Communist governments of the rights of
American citizens who owned property in foreign countries." Edward D. Re, The
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and the Cuban Claims Program, 1 INT'L
LAW. 81, 83 (1966).
10. See Clinton Lifts Vietnam Embargo, EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, Feb. 28,
1994, available in 1994 WL 2247089.
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neurs or investors will bring an eventual influx of capital to
Vietnam. 1 Yet the U.S. embargo against Cuba lingers. The
Cuban embargo, which began before full U.S. military involve-
ment in Vietnam, is in its third decade without any plans for
its future termination. 2 The United States seems to be await-
ing the day that the island nation might revert to the capitalist
investment state that it once was.
13
Although an entire world separates Vietnam and Cuba,
there are interesting parallels and distinctions between the
two trade embargoes. To begin, both Cuba and Vietnam be-
came Communist states after major governmental upheav-
als.'4 Both countries were given substantial aid by Commu-
nist superpowers such as China and the former Soviet Union,
and both suffered economically with the fall of the Socialist
Bloc.'5 From a U.S. perspective, the most important similarity
is that both countries exercised major expropriations 6 of
American property interests, and refused to adhere to the
"compensation principle" of international law. 7  Both
countries' histories diverge when the respective strategies
toward settling the expropriation issue with the United States
are examined.
11. See Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1583.
12. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 2, at 56.
13. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Reso-
lution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INTL
Bus. L. 217, 217-19 (1995).
14. Cuba's government changed to Communist ideology when Fidel Castro
came to power after usurping the Batista regime. Vietnam became a fully Commu-
nist state after the U.S. pullout in 1975, when Saigon fell to the Communists. See
Vietnam, in UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK 1995 453, 453 (1995) [hereinafter FACTBOOK]; KCWDlKaleidoscope-Cuba
and Vietnam Profiles, available in LEXIS, World Library, KCWD File [hereinafter
KCWD]; Ron First, Cuba's Changing Foreign Investment Climate: Castro's Attempt
to Lure Foreign Investors, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 295, 297 (1996); ROBERT GOLDSTON,
THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION 82-89 (1972).
15. See FACTBOOK, supra note 14, at 453. For an in-depth discussion of aid to
Vietnam prior to U.S. engagement, see GOLDSTON, supra note 14.
16. Expropriation is defined as "[a] taking, as of privately owned property, by
government under eminent domain." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (6th ed. 1990).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712(1) (1987).
State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Nationals of Other States:
A state is responsible under international law for injuries of the property
of a national of another state that is:
a) not for a public purpose, or
b) is discriminatory.
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After a war with the United States and the downfall of the
Soviet Union, Vietnam's economy was in turmoil. The Viet-
namese Government realized that the world economy was
growing without its own and made efforts to offer the United
States a settlement of the expropriation issue."8 Though Viet-
nam has yet to actually return money or property, Vietnam
made an important gesture by negotiating settlement strate-
gies that the United States could accept without losing face in
the international political forum. 9 In contrast, Cuba has
failed to make any offer to compensate the property owners
who lost billions of dollars in property to expropriations since
1959.20 Thus, the U.S. strategy of continuing the Cuban em-
bargo today hinges on the issue of expropriations.2'
In the 1990s, the United States cited Communism as the
foremost tenet of conflict with the Vietnamese Government's
policies, followed by the MIA issue, and lastly expropria-
tions.22 Although Vietnam remains Communist, it has worked
towards giving closure to the MIA issue, and more importantly,
offered an arrangement for settling the expropriation claims of
U.S. nationals.' It seems likely that Cuba and the United
States could come to a similar arrangement. In fact, it would
appear to be a simpler issue than in Vietnam because there is
no legacy of military intervention in Cuba. Cuba expropriated
billions of dollars in property and now needs to give restitu-
tion. Here, only money, not lives, are involved in the dispute.
Utilizing diplomacy, and a well-drafted bilateral investment
treaty (BIT), relations between the United States and Cuba
18. See F. Gale Connor, Vietnam: Trading With the Enemy or Investing in the
Future, 25 LAW & POLY INTL BUS. 481, 481 (1994).
19. See Thomas J. Lang, Satisfaction of Claims Against Vietnam for the Ex-
propriation of U.S. Citizens' Property in South Vietnam in 1975, 28 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 265, 270 (1995).
20. See Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Final Report of the Cuban
Claims Program, at 25 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 FCSC Report].
21. There is no single internationally accepted definition of "expropriation."
Different states interpret the term differently; appearing to suit the need of the
state. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17.
22. See Vietnam Relations: Looking Forward: Before the House of Representa-
tives, 141 Cong. Rec. 59,725 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Daschle). The MIA "issue"
relates to the soldiers reported as missing in action during the Vietnam War.
Vietnam had agreed to return any prisoners of war, or their remains, as part of
the Paris Accords. Id. See Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Vietnam, Jan. 27, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1, 935 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter Paris Accords].
23. See Connor, supra note 18, at 486.
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could be normalized, billions of dollars in investment opportu-
nity could be realized and the Western Hemisphere could even-
tually be without a Communist economy.
This Note will begin by briefly exploring the history be-
hind each conflict, and the resulting embargoes imposed by the
United States. It will not advocate political reasons for lifting
the Cuban embargo, but rather assert a practical methodology
utilizing current legislation. This Note assumes the position
that the United States should lift the embargo. Cuba's recent
trend toward capitalism has revitalized financial markets in
which American businesses are prohibited from participating,
while global investors funnel capital into Cuba investing in the
natural resources found there and offshore.' Since the demise
of the former Soviet Union, Cuba has lost billions in annual
aid." Today, Cuba cannot adequately feed or supply
healthcare for its citizens, yet Castro and his regime remain
vibrant.26 One explanation is that foreign investors are keep-
ing the Cuban economy afloat." Thus U.S. policy towards Cu-
ba is pragmatically and economically obsolete.
This Note concludes with an exploration of the parallels
and distinctions between the embargoes against Vietnam and
Cuba, and argues that the parallels outweigh the distinctions.
Thus, the United States should follow the same strategies that
were used with Vietnam to settle the dispute with Cuba. Con-
versely, Cuba must approach the United States with settle-
ment measures akin to those offered by Vietnam. This may
serve to allow the United States and Cuba to once again share
in the wealth of a trade route separated only by ninety miles.
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT AND SUBSEQUENT EMBARGO
AGAINST CUBA
On May 15, 1997, the U.S. Government, as authorized by
24. See Suzanne Bilello, Still on the Sidelines: Hard-line Stance on Cuba May
Mean Missed Opportunities for U.S. Business, NEWSDAY, Sep. 18, 1994, at A8 (ob-
serving that "[t]he 34-year-old U.S. trade embargo against Cuba ... keeps Ameri-
can businesses watching from the sidelines in a sort of economic quarantine.").
25. See FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
26. See John W. Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo
Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate, 21 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 66,
66 (1995).
27. Id. at 100.
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statute, once again approved legislation that has been in place
since 1960.28 To summarize the language of the statute:
No assistance shall be furnished... to the government of
Cuba... the President is authorized to establish and main-
tain a total embargo upon all trade between the United
States and Cuba ... until the President determines that such
government has taken appropriate steps according to interna-
tional law standards to return to U.S. Citizens... property
taken from such citizens and entities on or after January 1,
1959, by the government of Cuba.29
The foregoing language summarizes the US. policy regard-
ing the trade embargo against Cuba. However, there is no
clear reason for the United States to continue to maintain an
embargo, given the contemporary geopolitical climate. This
section will briefly explore the history of the adversarial rela-
tionship between the United States and Cuba.
Prior to the "Castro revolution" of 1959, Cuba's economy
was characterized as a "mercantilist oligarchic system."30
Though the Cuban Government claimed to be a capitalist
state, the reality was that only wealthy Cubans could afford to
participate in the market of goods and ideas.3 ' The classes
were extremely stratified and the most viable way to achieve
entry into the Cuban entrepreneurial market was through
"favors" paid to government officials. While this policy did
not prevent the participation of wealthy industrialists or Amer-
ican business interests, the majority of middle-class Cubans
were unable to participate significantly in the Cuban econo-
my 3 3 In the early 1950s, Fidel Castro, a Communist leader
who believed that a Communist/Socialist way of life was pref-
erable to the status quo, began a decade-long overthrow of the
28. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 (West 1990).
29. Id.
30. Free Trade with Cuba Act, 1994: Hearings on H.R. 2229 Before the
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures and the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 321 (1994) (statement of Irene Philippi,
Senior Economist with Polyconomics, Inc.) [hereinafter Philippi]. Philippi spoke at
length about the possibility of reforms in Cuba and the need for the relationship
with the United States to become more open and "normal." Id.
31. Id. at 322.
32. Id.
33. See HERBERT L. MATHEWs, REVOLUTION IN CUBA 121 (1975).
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Cuban Government and society.34
From 1959-1963 Castro's "new" government instilled its
Socialist policies throughout Cuba culminating in the expropri-
ation of all properties in Cuba, American and otherwise, for
the use of the "new" government.35 Until the expropriations,
owners of American businesses on the island were unsure of
how the new regime would govern Cuba.36 U.S. investors,
from energy companies to hoteliers, had enjoyed Cuba's rich
economic and natural resources which Cuba offered so close to
American soil for many years. 7 For Americans, Cuba offered
an oil-rich Caribbean tax shelter.3 " As long as the investing
businesses followed the government's unspoken "rules," they
were allowed to "reap what they could sow." 9
However, beginning in late 1959 and continuing into the
middle of 1963, Castro expropriated U.S. manufacturing and
production interests in Cuba.4 ° In retaliation, the U.S. Con-
gress amended the Sugar Act of 194841 in 1960 to permit a
reduction of the sugar quota from Cuba.42 The Cuban Govern-
ment viewed and treated this action as an act of war by the
United States. It enacted "Law No. 851" which gave the Cuban
President and the Prime Minister the power to nationalize by
forced expropriation "property or enterprises in which Ameri-
can nationals had an interest."43
While it is certain that the United States seriously dam-
aged Cuba's economy with its reduction of the sugar quota,
34. Id. at 11.
35. See generally Smagula, supra note 26, at 74.
36. See MATTHEWS, supra note 33, at 125.
37. Id. at 126.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 130.
40. See MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF
FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-108 (1976).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 1158 (1960).
42. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). At
issue in this case was whether the Act of State doctrine protected Cuba's actions
with respect to its territorial jurisdiction over the U.S. sugar company located in
Cuba. The Court discussed both the propriety of the congressional action, as well
as the Cuban law under international law.
43. Ley [Law] 851, July 6, 1960, Gaceta Oficial, July 7, 1960, reprinted in 55
AM. J. INTL L. 822, 822-24 (1961). Resolution No. 1, issued pursuant to Law 851,
authorized the nationalization of American owned businesses. This nationalization
resolution was followed by Resolutions 2 and 3 respectively, which effectively took
over American banks, and other properties.
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Cuba's subsequent expropriations effectively severed diplomat-
ic relations with the United States." In 1960, President Ei-
senhower took the reduction of the sugar quota one step fur-
ther and announced the embargo on "almost all trade to Cu-
ba."45 Cuba would have almost surely met with economic and
social ruin if the former Soviet Union had not provided billions
in annual aid.46 Any discussion of the effects of the American
trade embargo from a U.S. perspective, without accounting for
Soviet assistance to Cuba, is rather disingenuous, as it cannot
be convincingly determined whether Cuba and Castro would
have survived for decades without the aid of a superpower
such as the former Soviet Union. Therefore, an argument can
be made that Soviet aid created the need for the U.S. embargo.
In 1964, the U.S. Congress established the Cuban Claims
Program (CCP) to determine the amount of claims on expropri-
ated property by U.S. nationals against the Cuban Govern-
ment." The CCP certified that 5,911 claims on expropriated
property worth U.S. $1.8 billion were viable and, at a rate of
6% interest, these claims were worth U.S. $5.6 billion by
1995."8 The amount of property taken and the threat of Com-
munism ninety miles south of Miami motivated the U.S. Gov-
ernment to implement programs to end Communism in the
Western Hemisphere.49 The U.S. Government was not com-
fortable having a "pipeline" for the Soviet Union so close to its
shores. The pressure around this tense situation culminated
with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when a U.S. spy plane
discovered that Cuba was stockpiling Soviet nuclear mis-
siles.50 Though the crisis was averted, the "threat" of Cuba
44. See FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
45. JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENTS' SECRET WARS 189 (1986).
46. The total output in Cuba dropped by 50% in the years after the fall of
the Soviet Union, and treating the aid given/lost to Cuba by the U.S.S.R. as a bell
curve, the aid given to Cuba at the apex of the former Soviet Union's power in
the 1960s and 1970s can be argued to have been the lifeblood of a revolution. See
FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1988) (as amended 1994).
48. See 1973 FCSC Report, supra note 20. Although this amount may not be
staggering in 1999, it is extremely significant when compared to the loss of im-
portable income that Cuba has missed each year since the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion.
49. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 1401.
50. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1548.
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became very vivid in the American psyche.5' Tensions be-
tween the United States and Cuba were the most strained
during this "peak" of the Cold War.52
Utilizing international law as a basis for its embargo, the
United States' sanctions against Cuba were to fight Commu-
nism.53 However, the U.S. Government's true impetus for the
embargo against Cuba appears to have been the seeking of
restitution for U.S. businesses which lost money and property
in the Cuban nationalization program.54 With the demise of
the former Soviet Bloc, resulting in Cuba's economic instability
due to lost aid, the United States is left with a single unsettled
issue-property expropriation.55 The United States must now
rely solely on the strength of the expropriation argument for
the embargo against Cuba to remain valid.
III. EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
The U.S. trade embargo against Cuba has been in place
since 1961."6 In the thirty-eight years since, a multitude of
U.S. statutes and regulations have been implemented with the
ultimate goal of restricting trade with Cuba as completely as
possible.57 The regulations in toto consist of an "extraordinari-
ly comprehensive range of financial, commercial and trade
transactions and transactions involving property of almost any
kind, unless licensed by the Department of the Treasury.""
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercsion and the General Assembly: A
Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old
Embargo Against Cuba, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 901, 912 (1995).
54. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17 (discussing the U.S. policy regarding
expropriations).
55. See generally Smagula, supra note 26.
56. Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorized the Presi-
dent to impose a trade embargo against Cuba. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1993)
[hereinafter FAA of 1961]; the Cuban Solidarity Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-
6010 (1992).
57. See FAA of 1961, supra note 56; Cuban Solidarity Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6010. See Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1,085 (1962) (establishing a
comprehensive embargo on Cuba); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §
515 (1999) (implementing regulations of transactions with Cuba and Cuban proper-
ty).
58. Dennis M. O'Connell, Are the U.S. Treasury's Assets Control Regulations a
Fair and Effective Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy? The Case of Cuba, 79 AM. SOCY
INT'L L. PROC. 169, 169-89 (1985).
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Like the embargo against Vietnam, the statutory basis for the
embargo against Cuba is the Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917 (TWEA).59 The statutes and regulations enabling the
embargo have been evolving since 1963.60 But what effect has
the embargo had on Cuba over thirty years? There is no sign
that Fidel Castro is about to step down from power, or that
Cuba is remaining in the financial straits that they and other
Socialist Bloc countries, specifically Vietnam, suffered after the
fall of the former Soviet Union.
In 1960, the United States demanded from Cuba the resti-
tution of expropriated property, however, the U.S. reduction of
the sugar quota may have eliminated the monetary possibility
for Cuba to restore the value of any taken property.61 As one
commentator has theorized, the United States "may have been
more concerned with ensuring, financially, that Cuba would
not be able to export its sugar to other countries."62 If this
was indeed the strategy, it failed as Cuba initially agreed with
the Soviet Union on February 13, 1960 to provide one million
tons of sugar per year for five years, and provide East Germa-
ny, Poland and China, collectively, an additional 180,000
tons.13 Though this initial total was roughly one-third of the
amount of sugar that the United States had been importing
from Cuba, it indicated that U.S. trade sanctions would not
necessarily have their desired effect.64  The Castro
government's position was that the reduction in the sugar
quota for import to the United States was a step away from an
59. Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1988) [hereinafter TWEA].
60. See generally Jerry W. Cain, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of the United
States' Trade Embargo Against Cuba: The United Nations General Assembly's Call
for an End to the U.S. Trade Embargo, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379 (1994).
61. See Smagula, supra note 26, at 73; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs on Claims of U.S.
Nationals Against the Government of Cuba, 88th Cong. 164, 164 (1964). The Acting
Legal Advisor of the Department of State, Leonard Meeker, said, "it is clear that
the funds which would be available for distribution under a vesting of Cuban
assets would be trivial when compared to the losses which have been sustained
[by Cuba.]" Id.
62. See Smagula, supra note 26, at 73.
63. Id. at 73 nn.67, 68 (citing Fidel Castro, The Case of Cuba is the Case of
All Underdeveloped Countries, Address Before the U.N. General Assembly 31, 39
n.64 (Sept. 26, 1960)).
64. Ley de Reforma Agraria [Agrarian Reform Law] 1959, 7 Leyes del
Gobierno Provisional de la Revolucion 135 (1959). The 1959 U.S. allotment for
sugar from Cuba was 3,215,000 tons for the year.
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ideological market-slavery to an export economy, and thus, was
a positive move for Cuba.65
Another U.S. action against Cuba's Communism was the
failed "Bay of Pigs" invasion in the spring of 1961, in which
U.S. trained and funded Cuban anti-Castro forces landed in
Cuba and attempted an overthrow of the Castro government.
Castro's forces summarily defeated them in three days.66 Ulti-
mately, 1400 anti-Castro Cubans were taken prisoner and the
United States was forced to pay a humbling U.S. $53 million
in medicine and equipment for their release.67 Despite these
incidents, Cuba did not remain completely unaffected by the
U.S. embargo; by 1964 every nation belonging to the Organiza-
tion of American States, with the exception of Mexico, had
severed ties with Cuba.66 As Cuba's trade and diplomatic rela-
tions in the Western Hemisphere diminished or disappeared
altogether, Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union strength-
ened.6 9 During the 1960s, Cuban reliance on Soviet aid had
been reported to be as much as the equivalent of one million
U.S. dollars per day.7" In 1972, the Soviet Union forgave
Cuba's accumulated debt.7' It appeared that although the
United States had affected a total embargo on goods to and
from Cuba (with the exception of medicinal and humanitarian
aid), Cuba was able to circumvent the embargo by dealing with
other sympathetic Communist countries.
Cuba's success at this circumvention came to an end, much
like Vietnam's had, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989.
Cuba began to suffer severe economic hardship. The Cuban
65. See ERIC. N. BAKLANOFF, EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN CUBA,
MEXICO, AND CHILE 118 (1975).
66. See First, supra note 14, at 299.
67. See GEORGIE A. GEYER, GUERILLA PRINCE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FIDEL
CASTRO, 270-79 (1991).
68. See BAKLANOFF, supra note 65, at 119. It must be noted that the majority
of Latin States severed ties due to Cuban activities in Latin America, notably a
guerrilla invasion of Venezuela in 1964. Id.
69. See CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 42 (James D. Rudolph ed., 1985).
70. BAKLANOFF, supra note 65, at 120. This amount excludes military aid.
71. Id. at 121 (noting that beyond merely forgiving a huge amassed debt, esti-
mated at $2.2 billion in trade deficit, the U.S.S.R. also agreed to pay twice the
regular rate for sugar).
72. See Jos6 de Cordoba, Cuba's Business Law Puts Off Foreigners: Even Cas-
tro Concedes Disappointing Response, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1995, at A16 (reporting
the Cuban economic future as "delicate" due to the Cuban economy's growth of
only 0.7% in 1994).
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economic growth rate declined by one-third in the four years
after the downfall of the Soviet Union,73 giving credence to
the argument that without Soviet assistance, the embargo
against Cuba may have indeed met with the "success" the U.S.
Government had wished for. Once the Soviet Empire fell, the
need for foreign investment came once again to the forefront of
Cuban policy.74
On September 5, 1995 Cuba passed a new foreign invest-
ment law which had among its goals "the protection of Cuba's
accomplishments from the demise of the Socialist Bloc, as well
as from the embargo."75 Cuba apparently recognized the need
for foreign investment to assist with an influx of capital and
technology. The law cites the "globalization of the world econo-
my" and the "strong hegemonistic tendencies in the economic,
political, and military fields" as reasons for why Cuba must
resuscitate its foreign investment policies.76
Today in Cuba, more bicycles than automobiles travel
Cuba's streets,77 but as of 1992 Cuba was close to completing
its first nuclear power plant.78 Cuba also maintains business
ties with much of the world and in 1992, for the first time
since the fall of the Soviet Union (when Cuba's economy was
cut by two-thirds), Cuba's economy grew 0.7%.79 Cuba also
has had growth in foreign investment, with Cuban officials
claiming "as of mid-1995 that foreign investment totaled over 2
billion."" One commentator noted "that this figure was proba-
bly overstated due to the confidential nature of foreign invest-
ment, and the fact that such investments are spread out over a
period of years; the true figure was probably closer to 500 mil-
lion."" However, the point remains that Cuba and Castro,
73. Id.
74. See James D. Whisensand, Cuba's Legal Structure: How it Affects Foreign
Investment and Trade, COLUlM. J. WORLD Bus., Spring 1995, at 16, 16-17.
75. Law Number 77, Foreign Investment Act, Final Provision (1995).
76. Id.; see First, supra note 14, at 299-300.
77. See Jonathan P. Decker, The $800 Million Question: is Cuba Building a
Potential Chernobyl in U.S. Backyard?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 1995, at
11; First, supra note 14 at 318.
78. See Decker, supra note 77, at 11.
79. See FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
80. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features
of a Foreign Investment Code for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 511, 513 (1996).
81. Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Investors Find Cuba Tantalizing Yet Murky in Fi-
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while suffering economically at the hands of the U.S. embargo,
have not been "defeated" into submission to democratic ideolo-
gy. Rather, Cuba appears to have survived the fall of the Sovi-
et Union and appears to be on the way to a recovery, if only a
mild one.
IV. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT WITH VIETNAM
Like Cuba, Vietnam has until relatively recently been a
primary motivating force for continuing U.S. anti-Communist
foreign policy." Many of the tenets of the U.S. conflict with
Vietnam parallel those of the conflict between the United
States and Cuba. Both countries have undergone tremendous
upheaval due to revolution, and the socio-political strife that
had racked both countries has merged them in the wake of the
U.S. struggle against Communism.83
To understand the tensions between the United States and
Vietnam, it is important to examine the history of Vietnam.
Vietnam in the 1960s was a country of 24 million people divid-
ed in half by a "demilitarized zone" (DMZ)." The North was
reserved for Communist followers of Ho Chi Minh, while the
South was the Democratic stronghold." It was in response to
the impending invasion by North Vietnam into South Vietnam
that the United States sent hundreds of thousands of troops
and "advisers" into Vietnam in order to protect the dying de-
mocracy.8 The U.S.-Vietnam war was the culmination of a
long line of struggles by the people of Vietnam. Occupation by
Chinese Buddhists, Indonesian Khmers, Hindus, the French
and Communists had seen the Vietnamese people struggle not
only for independence, but for a cultural identity.87 With less
than a thousand miles between its northern and southern
borders, and at most a width of 330 miles, Vietnam has never
been truly united politically.88 Even the Vietnamese language
nancial Matters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1995, at Al; Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra
note 80, at 514.
82. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1558.
83. Id.
84. See GOLDSTON, supra note 14, at 82-89 (1972).
85. Id.
86. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1558.
87. See GOLDSTON, supra note 14, at 18-21.
88. Id. at 16.
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may be considered a form of Chinese.89
Beginning in 1787, Vietnam was effectively given to the
French."° In an arrangement reminiscent of old-time gangster
movies, a dispossessed Vietnamese ruler came to the court of
Louis the XIV to ask for protection, in the form of French
troops, from any invading forces.9' Thus, colonialist France
viewed Vietnam as a new Oriental outpost with a safe trade
route to the Far East, rather than a country with a people
hungry for their own identity and culture.92
Negative Vietnamese sentiment against the French was
quick to take hold and was never fully extinguished, nor was
the French desire to profit from Vietnam's resources.93 France
lost its trading outpost when Vietnam was occupied by Japan
during World War II, however, after the Americans defeated
Japan, France attempted to reassert power over Vietnam.94
France might have succeeded were it not for the appearance of
Ho Chi Minh 5
Ho Chi Minh was a believer in Vietnamese independence
and a Communist.96 However, Ho's beliefs in a strong, and
more importantly, independent Vietnam are arguably more
reminiscent of Gandhi than of Marx.97 Ho Chi Minh believed
that Vietnam should be free to decide her own political and
military fate, he eventually took over a small part of Northern
Vietnam and began an insurgency called the 'ietminh." 5
When Ho Chi Minh came to power in 1946 as president of
the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, ruling
in the south, realized that it would have to deal with Ho Chi
89. Id. at 19-21.
90. Id. at 32-33.
91. Id. at 32.
92. Id. at 35.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 64-67.
95. Ho Chi Minh was the first successful leader of a Vietnamese independence
movement. Id.
96. See GOLDSTON, supra note 14, at 52-53.
97. This statement is not to compare Ho Chi Minh with Gandhi except to
highlight a shared intense desire for independence that they both possessed for
their countries. It is not difficult to understand how Ho Chi Minh became enrap-
tured with communist ideology. For hundreds of years his country had been sub-
ject to French rule, used as a funnel for profits from Southeast Asia and had
constantly been besieged by class struggle.
98. See GOLDSTON, supra note 14, at 67-69.
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Minh or face war.9 Yet, after many failed attempts at negoti-
ating a peaceful co-existence between Vietnam and France,
armed conflict was inevitable.' 0 In protracted fighting that
continued until the French pullout in 1954, guerrilla warfare
became a way of life for the Vietnamese. 1 During this peri-
od, China, bordering Vietnam to the north, had "fallen" to
Communism when Mao Tse-tung defeated Chiang Kai-
shek.112 This allowed Ho Chi Minh to have his northern
stronghold fortified with military and monetary aid from Chi-
na.' 3 This new Communist pipeline may be the single most
important piece of history when attempting to understand the
reasons for American involvement in the conflict.
10 4
The French pulled out of South Vietnam in 1954 as per
the Geneva Accords.0 5 The subsequent fighting between the
Vietnamese over who would rule the newly independent state,
the northern Communist Ho Chi Minh or the southern Demo-
cratic President Diem, was not the major concern to American
advisers and politicos. The major fear was that North Vietnam,
faced with the looming presence of communist China, would
quickly become a puppet government of the Chinese and the
Soviet Union, and usurp any power of the Geneva Accords to
keep peace in the divided nation.0 8 After the sacrifices made
fighting the Japanese during World War II, the United States
was afraid to neglect Vietnam, perhaps allowing Asia to fall
99. Id. at 83.
100. Id. at 84-88.
101. Id. at 93.
102. Mao Tse-tung defeated Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. See 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 191 (1994).
103. See GOLDSTON, supra note 14.
104. The reason behind this is that the United States has never entered a war,
other than the American Civil War, without extreme economic incentive to do so.
The United States had relatively recently fought an extremely costly war in the
Pacific during World War II, and more recently in Korea. After these conflicts, the
administrations were heavily vested in ensuring that the Asia markets remain
open and free of Communism. The American disagreement with Communism ex-
tends beyond ideology, however, and into economics. A burgeoning "Communist
market" in Asia is a misnomer, as a Communist state is, in effect, no market at
all. Id.
105. See Paris Accords, supra note 22; Thomas J. Lang, Satisfaction of Claims
Against Vietnam for the Expropriation of U.S. Citizens' Property in South Vietnam
in 1975, 28 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 265, 270 (1995).
106. See generally Thomas R. Stauch, The United States and Vietnam: Overcom-
ing the Past and Investing in the Future, 28 INT'L LAW.,995, 1004 (1994).
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into the hands of Communism one country at a time, much
like a set of dominoes.
107
The "domino theory" was widely espoused in Washington
as incentive for the United States to enter into the political
forum in Vietnam, to support the French and the Southern
Democratic Republic, and to help stem the growth of Commu-
nism. °8 President Eisenhower decided to send "advisers" to
South Vietnam to assist the French in maintaining the peace
of the Geneva Accords.' 9 In 1954, Eisenhower appeared inno-
cently, or naively, to sign the fates of many lives away with a
simple letter to President Diem that offered, in part, "how an
intelligent program of American aid given directly to your gov-
ernment can serve to assist Vietnam in its hour of trial." 10
This letter never mentioned the words "military action," and
Eisenhower never stated or intended that the United States
would help South Vietnam fight a war."' Yet, the scars that
the Vietnam War left are still palpable in the minds of many
Americans. The total trade embargo against Vietnam, begun in
1975 by President Ford, was a lasting symbol of the animus
between the United States and Vietnam."'
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO AGAINST VIETNAM
In 1964, because of intensifying military action between
the northern Communists and South Vietnam, the United
States began a trade embargo against what was then North
Vietnam."' The Foreign Assets Control Regulations embargo
107. See ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF
VIETNAM 97 (1995).
108. Id.; see generally Stauch supra note 106, at 1003.
109. See GOLDSTON, supra note 14, at 109.
110. Id. at 130.
111. Id. at 131.
112. See Beth Castelli, The Lifting of the Trade Embargo Between the United
States and Vietnam: The Loss of a Potential Bargaining Tool or a Means of Foster-
ing Co-operation?, 13 DICK. J. INTL L. 297, 301-03 (1994). The embargo was the
last in a line of sanctions that the United States began against Vietnam. The
theory behind the measure was that a U.S. embargo would encourage other states
to abide. by the spirit, if not the technicalities, of the embargo. See WILLIAM J.
DUIKER, VIETNAM: REVOLUTION IN TRANSITION 211 (2d ed., 1995). This is indeed
what happened as "[t]he invasion had equally disruptive effects on Vietnam's rela-
tions with its neighbors in the region." Id. However, the United States was aware
of the flow of Communist capital that would continue with or without an embargo.
Id.
113. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1993). See Stauch,
244 [Vol. XXV:I
19991 LIFTING THE CUBAN EMBARGO 245
powers stemmed from powers granted in the TWEA."4 The
TWEA was designed to hinder the strengthening of the Ger-
man economy after World War .115 The TWEA powers were
used for the same purpose in Vietnam; it was hoped that the
embargo would make the success of a northern Communist
governmental takeover in the South difficult, if not impossi-
ble." 6 However, as with Cuba, the embargo against North
Vietnam did not have the desired effect, as China and the
former Soviet Union were ignoring the embargo and supplying
the Viet Cong from the Vietnam/China border."'
After the fall of Saigon to Communist forces in 1975, the
Communist government commandeered the Vietnamese econo-
my, as well as its political and social climate,"8 and the Unit-
ed States utilized the TWEA to extend its trade embargo to
include South Vietnam."' Since the United States was no
longer technically "at war" with North Vietnam, the powers of
the TWEA were utilized to cover the takeover of South Viet-
nam under authority of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA)."2 ° The IEEPA gives the President the
ability to act on any "unusual and (extraordinary external)
threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of
supra note 106, at 1004; Merian Nash Leich, Foreign Assets Control, 84 AM. J.
INTL. L. 536, 539 (1990). The Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR) were
first utilized to impose an embargo on trade or financial transactions against Chi-
na and North Korea, both Communist countries. The FACR were also utilized to
freeze any assets of the two countries within the United States. The United States
extended the regulations to reach North Vietnam on May 5, 1964, and South Viet-
nam on April 30, 1975. South Vietnam was added due to the Communist takeover
of Saigon (renamed Ho Chi Minh City), and the subsequent U.S. pullout of the
country. Id.
114. TWEA supra note 59, at app. §§ 1-44 (1988). FACR are authorized by §
5(b) of the TWEA, which states:
(b)(1) During time of war, the President may
(A) . . . prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange . . . and the
importing, exporting of currency or securities, and
(B) . . . prohibit transactions involving any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.
115. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 302.
116. Id.
117. See Stauch, supra note 106, at 1002; GOLDSTON, supra note 14, at 144.
"In fact North Vietnamese independence of both Moscow and Peking was in direct
proportion to how much aid North Vietnam required." Id.
118. See Stauch supra note 106, at 1005.
119. Id.; 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988); Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1586.
120. IEEPA of 1977 § 202; 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
BROOK.J. INTL L.
the United States, if the President declares a national emer-
gency with respect to such threat."12' The perceived threat to
the United States was the same as stated for the War, that
Vietnam was only the first in a series of dominoes that would
fall to Communism. 1
22
The embargo against Vietnam "encompassed import, ex-
port, travel, and financial dealings between any U.S. individual
or organization and Vietnam or any of its nationals, and the
TWEA and IEEPA imposed penalties for violations of its
terms.""s This was in contrast to the Paris Peace Agree-
ments of 1973" where the United States had agreed to as-
sist Vietnam with post-war reconstruction."m The effects of
the embargo were soon felt in Vietnam as other countries abid-
ed by the embargo, and Vietnam became ineligible for interna-
tional loans."
As the embargo continued through the 1970s, several ob-
stacles to ending the embargo materialized. In 1973, with the
Paris Accords, and the U.S. promise to assist with Vietnam's
post-war reconstruction, Vietnam promised to assist with the
resolution of the MIA issue. "7 These two key promises never
came to fruition.'2' As the fall of Saigon became a reality, the
United States gave up hope that the Paris Accords would re-
solve the MIA issue, thus making it a major impetus for exten-
sion and continuation of the embargo.
129
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter appeared willing to relax
the trade embargo against Vietnam; travel restrictions to Viet-
121. Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1586 n.18.
122. See generally Stauch, supra note 106.
123. Id. at 1007.
124. See generally Lang, supra note 105.
125. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 304.
126. See Stauch, supra note 106, at 1008 n.95 (citing Decision on Vietnam Rela-
tions is Due Soon, Christopher Says, INTL TRADE REP., June 23, 1993). "The Unit-
ed States is the largest shareholder in the IMF, and as such, can block lend-
ing . . . by persuading other major shareholders . . . to support its position." Id.
127. See Paris Accords, supra note 22. The Paris Accords included a protocol on
Prisoners and Detainees wherein North Vietnam agreed to return 591 claimed
American prisoners of war, as well as the remains of those Killed In Action whose
bodies had yet to be returned. The Americans promised, in article 21 of the Ac-
cords that, "the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to
postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout
Indochina." Id. art. 21.
128. See Lang, supra note 105, at 270.
129. Id.
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nam from the United States were reduced and President Cart-
er sent an emissary to Vietnam to begin talks regarding the
normalization of relations.3 ° However, events in 1978 only
served to rejuvenate the U.S. determination to keep the embar-
go in place. First, Vietnam announced that it was to be allied
with the Soviet Union, and second, Vietnam invaded Cambodia
and established a Communist regime in that country. 3' Fi-
nally, Vietnam notified the United States that no more infor-
mation pertaining to American POWs/MIAs would be forthcom-
ing until the United States fulfilled its promise of reconstruc-
tion aid as agreed to in the Paris Accords.'32 As a result,
President Carter officially severed ties with Vietnam. The
United States held this stance until 1992 when President
George Bush was under fire from investors to open up the
Vietnamese market to U.S. capital.'
33
There is much evidence that Vietnam suffered under the
embargo. Even though no other country directly joined the U.S.
position, the U.S. embargo was readily, if reluctantly, acqui-
esced to by other states.34 Ironically, advocates of the embar-
go in the United States used the economic instability in Viet-
nam (arguably caused by the embargo), as one argument for its
continuation, stating that the benefits of lifting the embargo
were outweighed by risks of investing there. 1
35
The embargo was one cause of Vietnam's reliance on trade
with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. After the
war between the United States and Vietnam, the Soviet Union
annually funneled an average of three billion U.S. dollars into
130. See Robert J. Sutter, Vietnam-U.S. Relations: The Debate Over Normal-
ization, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. IB93081, at 2-4 (1993).
Among the Administration's goals were easing Vietnamese nationals' emigration to
America, resolving issues surrounding Amerasians, and release of Vietnamese who
had been imprisoned in Vietnam for being American sympathizers during the war.
Id.
131. See Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1587.
132. See Sutter, supra note 130, at 4.
133. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 311.
134. See Stauch, supra note 106, at 1009 n.99. Japan and France "were hesi-
tant to begin economic relations with Vietnam for fear that the United States
would take offense at such action." Andrew Sherry, U.S. Embargo's End Will
Bring Investment But Not Miracles to Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 4,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
135. See Raymond J. Abeam & Robert J. Sutter, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Vietnam-U.S. Normalization: Considerations for 1993, 16 (1993).
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the Vietnamese economy.3 ' The Soviet Union's incentive for
supplying a large amount of aid to Vietnam was not simply to
spread Marxist ideology, but also in exchange for offshore oil
exploration rights.'37 For Vietnam, this relationship with the
Soviet Union led to Hanoi's modeling of the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment after the "central government" model of the Soviet
Union. Unfortunately, Vietnam's economy soon paralleled the
economic woes of the Soviet Union. 3 ' Under the Soviet model
of "centralized state planning" the formerly private industries
of Vietnam no longer profited, and the formerly profitable
agrarian culture eroded and Vietnam became one of the poor-
est countries in the world with an average per capita income of
under U.S. $200 per year."'
Vietnam's economic dependence on Soviet aid left it almost
entirely at the mercy of the Soviet economy. Therefore, when
the Soviet Union began to experience economic difficulties,
repercussions were felt in Hanoi. 40 The lack of Soviet success
with offshore oil exploration, coupled with the cuts in aid, led
Vietnamese leaders to become disgruntled with the Soviet
Union.' At Vietnam's sixth Communist party Congress in
1986, the Government of Vietnam revealed a new economic
policy: "doi moi" (renovation).4 2 This new policy was intended
to provide an avenue to a market economy while the govern-
ment continued to keep a tight hold of policy.' This first
step in the relinquishing of total control over a failing economy
was the genesis of the normalization of relations between Viet-
nam and the United States.
136. See Stauch, supra note 106, at 1009 n.101; Vietnam, IBC Int'l Country
Risk Guide, Oct. 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, IBCCRG File
[hereinafter Risk Guide].
137. See Stauch, supra note 106, at 1009 n.101.
138. See Michael Hirsh, Asia: East Asia's Not-Yet-Emerging Markets, INST. IN-
VESTOR, May 27, 1993.
139. See Stauch, supra note 106, at 1009.
140. See Risk Guide, supra note 136. Due to economic hardships, the Soviet
Union was no longer able to fund Vietnam as it had. In 1991, the Soviet Union
drastically cut its military aid to Vietnam. Id.
141. See International Relationships, POL. RISK SERVICES, Oct. 1992, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Rbtibc File.
142. Chris Pritchard, Vietnam: Welcoming a Capitalist Dawn, Bus. REV. WKLY.,
Nov. 8, 1991, at 22.
143. See Teresa Poole, Why Vietnam Needs America; They Want to Join the
World But the United States Won't Let Them, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 30, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
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VI. IMPLEMENTING STEPS FROM THE U.S./VIETNAMESE
AGREEMENT To END THE EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA.
In 1996, the United Nations voted 137-3 for a resolution
calling for an end to the Cuban embargo by the United
States.' Such a strong vote signified that the thirty-year
embargo has not carried favor with the rest of the world. The
advent of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996 (LIBERTAD) has not helped matters.45 The attempt by
the United States to proclaim through legislation that foreign
investment in Cuba will have negative repercussions clearly
represents a minority voice in the world today.'46 As one
scholar notes, "the United States is the only major country
that is not involved in the expansion of foreign investment in
Cuba." 1
47
Currently, the question seems not to be whether the Unit-
ed States should lift the embargo against Cuba, but rather
when and how the embargo will be lifted. The proposition may
not be a simple one given that the United States has invested
over three decades in a hard-line "full restitution or nothing"
stance with Cuba.' However, the difficulties involved in the
144. UN: Assembly Again Calls for End of United States Imposed Embargo
Against Cuba, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Allnws Library,
Curnws File. The only three countries to vote against the resolution were the
United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan. The resolution was based in obligations of
the United Nations Charter and international law. Id.
145. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22
U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton]; Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling
with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996, 14 ARiz. J. DL & COMP. L. 575 (1997); Helms/Burton and D'Amato the
European Response, EXPORT PRACTMIIONER, Dec. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL
15975995. The controversy surrounding Helms-Burton stems from civil liabilities
imposed on individuals or countries that "traffic in confiscated property" that pur-
portedly still belongs to U.S. nationals. See Dhooge, supra at 576. Canada and
Mexico, two NAFTA signatories, are especially perturbed by this policy, claiming
that at its core, it is an extraterritorial exercise of power by the United States.
Id. at 577.
146. See M2 PRESSWIRE, supra note 144.
147. See Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 80, at 514.
148. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 1645 (West 1990). The statute effectively lays out the
basic U.S. policy position towards Cuba and the embargo. The United States has
stated that Cuba must have free elections, while permitting opposition parties to
form, show respect for basic human liberties and civil rights, move towards a free
market economic system, and commit itself to constitutional change. See Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a) [hereinafter CDA]. This section of the
CDA is buttressed by 22 U.S.C. § 6006, which allows for the provision of food,
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lifting of the embargo should in no way deter the United
States and Cuba from negotiating a BIT that would be profit-
able and comfortable for both nations.
Lifting the embargo as it stands today, with a multitude of
statutes and regulations concerning its continuation and/or
lifting, may not be as simple an issue as the lifting of the em-
bargo against Vietnam. But an exploration of the practical
steps necessary to lifting it reveals that the embargo against
Cuba, if not the political repercussions, could be eliminated
within one year after both countries begin to move toward
issue settlement. This final section will examine the steps used
by Vietnam and the United States to bring an end to the ten-
sions between their governments, and how some of those same
steps should be taken by the United States and Cuba.
VI. ENDING THiE EMBARGO AGAINST VIETNAM
On January 28, 1995 Vietnam and the United States
signed the "Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain
Property Claims."49 Article 2 of the Agreement states, "[iun
full and final settlement of the claims covered by this agree-
ment, Vietnam shall pay the sum of U.S. $208,510,481 to the
United States and the United States shall unblock all assets of
Vietnam that are blocked by the United States .... 150 The
signing of this document in Saigon was the end result of a
process begun in 1992 by President George Bush and the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam to bring about normalization of the rela-
tionship between the United States and Vietnam. 5'
In 1992, President Bush allowed U.S. companies to sign
contracts with Vietnamese entities if they held them until the
lifting of the embargo and further allowed telecommunication
medicine, and medical supplies, if the President determines and certifies to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee
of Foreign Relations of the Senate, that Cuba has made a public commitment to
free elections within 6 months, and has made a public commitment to respecting
human rights, and is not providing weapons to any group or country that seeks
the violent overthrow of the government of that country. See Travieso-Diaz, supra
note 2, at 70.
149. Socialist Republic of Vietnam-United States Agreement Concerning the
Settlement of Certain Property Claims, Jan. 28, 1995, U.S.-Vietnam, 34 I.L.M. 685,
686 (1995).
150. Id. at 687.
151. See EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, supra note 10.
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links to be set up between the two countries.'52 In February
of 1994 President Clinton agreed to lift the nineteen-year-old
trade embargo against Vietnam. 5' He cited Vietnam's co-
operation on the MIA issue as the main reason for the lifting
of the embargo, satisfying proponents of the embargo who
viewed it as an effective bargaining tool in resolving the MIA
issue. 1 4 Until then, the American public's perception had
been that the MIA issue was unresolved and too important to
be forgotten. Public opinion had thwarted attempts by Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush to begin normalization talks or discus-
sions of the expropriated property settlement claims of U.S.
nationals.'55
While the embargo continued, American businesses forbid-
den from doing business in Vietnam were unable to tap a job
market of 70 million well-educated and highly disciplined peo-
ple, as well as natural resources, such as gas and oil. 5 ' Many
other nations, out of either economic or political respect for the
United States, refrained from doing business with Viet-
nam.5 7 The effects of the U.S. embargo, coupled with the
inefficiencies of the centrally planned economy caused
Vietnam's economic production to stagnate into the 1980s.'5 1
Vietnam's standard of living dropped to a gross national prod-
uct per capita of U.S. $200.19 As with Cuba and the rest of
the Soviet Bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 helped
create an atmosphere wherein the United States could realisti-
cally begin to look to normalize relations with these countries.
The Vietnamese Government, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, was faced with the need to revitalize their quick-
ly dying economy. Vietnam devised new investment laws that
were decidedly more relaxed than the previous ones.60 These
152. Id.
153. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 297.
154. Id. at 316; Clinton Lifts Vietnam Embargo; Emphasizes Further POW/MIA
Accounting, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A23 (Feb. 4, 1994).
155. See Lang, supra note 105, at 270.
156. Id. at 274; W. Gary Vause, Doing Business with Vietnam-Prospects and
Concerns for the 1990s, 4 FLA. J. INTVL L. 231, 235 (1989).
157. See Lang, supra note 105, at 273.
158. ADAM FFORDE & STEFAN DE VYLDER, VIETNAM, AN ECONOMY IN TRANSI-
TION 8-9 (1988).
159. VIETNAM'S DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS: THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC TRANSI-
TION IN THE 1990S 31 (Mya Than & Joseph L.H. Tan eds., 1993).
160. See Lang, supra note 105, at 274; Decree of the Council of Ministers Reg-
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laws, drafted in 1988, had among their goals "the promotion of
domestic economic development through increased exports,
exploitation of natural resources, and encouraged broad foreign
investment."6' As a result of the government's more relaxed
attitude towards investment, foreign investment in Vietnam
quickly increased from thirty-seven projects in 1988 totaling
$364 million, to over 150 projects in 1991 totaling $1.2 bil-
lion.'62 U.S. businesses recognized that foreign investment in
Vietnam was growing steadily and these business interests
began to pressure the American administration to allow them
to show their intentions to deal with Vietnam if the embargo
were lifted.'63
In April 1991, President Bush proposed a four step "road
map" to normalization of relations with Vietnam, including the
eventual lifting of the embargo." The first phase of the
"road map," with which the Vietnamese Government was to
comply, consisted of signing a peace accord with Cambodia,
and resolving all American POW/MIA cases. The United States
would then begin talks on normalizing relations, and allow its
citizens to travel to Vietnam.'65 Phase two consisted of Viet-
nam continuing to resolve the POW/MIA issue, and the U.S.
restoration of telecommunication links with Vietnam and al-
lowing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to export hu-
manitarian goods to Vietnam.'66 During this phase, the Unit-
ed States also sent delegates to Hanoi to begin negotiating the
details of the process. 6 '
Phase three began after the Cambodian peace agreement
and continued into the Clinton administration.6 8 Vietnam
ulating in Detail the Implementation of the Law of Foreign Investment in Vietnam
(No. 139/HDBT), Sept. 5, 1988, translated in E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., June 1989, at
25, 30.
161. See Vause, supra note 156.
162. See Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy: Reform Priorities-Foreign
Direct Investment, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Dec. 1993, at 9.
163. See Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1590; Clifford J. Shultz II. et al., Ameri-
can Involvement in Vietnam, Part 1I: Prospects for U.S. Business in a New Era,
BUS. HORIZONS, Mar.- Apr. 1995.
164. See Nayan Chanda, 'Road Map' To Renew Ties with Hanoi Could Lead to
Some Trade by Year End, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1991, at A10.
165. Id.
166. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 312.
167. Id. at 313.
168. Id.
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was required to withdraw troops from Cambodia, uphold the
Paris Peace Agreement, and continue to work on the POW/MIA
issue. The United States, in turn, retracted its opposition to
international aid for basic human needs and would assist in
rebuilding the infrastructure in Vietnam.'69 With the lack of
U.S. opposition and the commitment to the rebuilding process,
Vietnam was pledged over U.S. $2.5 billion in loans from
sources such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank.70 Also in Phase three, American firms were
allowed to bid on internationally financed projects in Vietnam,
and by 1996 the United States had invested U.S. $1.2 billion in
Vietnam, making America the sixth largest investor in Viet-
nam.'
17
The embargo had yet to be lifted, and President Clinton
faced staunch opposition by Vietnam Veterans groups and
supporters, who viewed the POW/MIA issue as a barrier to any
relations with Vietnam. 72 President Clinton, sympathetic to
these groups' concerns, resolved to ensure that Vietnam con-
tinued to be forthcoming on the MIA issue.73 Bolstering ad-
ministration efforts to bring the embargo to an end were sever-
al U.S. Congressmen who had served in Vietnam and who
openly advocated for the lifting of the embargo.'74 Finally, on
169. Id. Ironically at this juncture of the "road map" process the United States
and Vietnam had come full circle in the 1990s to follow the tenets of the Paris
Peace Accords set forth almost 20 years earlier.
170. See Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1592.
171. Id. at 1593.
172. Id.; Merrill Goozner, Clinton Opens the Door to Vietnam: Firms Get Access
to "Asian Tiger, Some Vets Protest, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1994, at 1.
173. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 315. Reminiscent of President Bush's "road
map," President Clinton cited four specific requirements for Vietnam before the
embargo would be lifted:
(i) all American remains were to be returned to the United States, and
Vietnam was to document efforts to recover these remains;
(ii) There was an issue of 92 "discrepancy cases" of MIAs, as well as
"live sightings" which were to be resolved;
(iii) Vietnam was to investigate further POW/MIA records in Laos; and
(iv) Vietnam was to increase efforts to provide all POW/MIA records from
governmental archives.
Id.
174. See Goozner, supra note 172, quoting Senator John McCain of Arizona,
"The United States gave its word that we would lift the embargo if the Vietnam-
ese substantially cooperated with us to determine the fate of our missing. They
have done so. It would be unfair, and beneath the dignity of the United States, to
go back on our word now." Id.
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February 4, 1994, President Clinton lifted the embargo against
Vietnam. He did not cite any economic reasons for doing so,
but instead cited progress by the Vietnamese Government on
the POW/MIA issue as the impetus for its lifting.7 '
The two countries are currently in phase four of President
Bush's "road map."'76 During this final phase, the United
States is to "oversee free elections in Cambodia, and will re-
move remaining restrictions on lending to Vietnam by interna-
tional financial institutions."'77 Vietnam and the United
States have taken great strides towards normalizing relations
between the two countries after many years of tension, war
and sanctions. Vietnam now has to look towards gaining des-
ignation first as a "beneficiary developing country," which
brings with it tariff preferences, and eventually to "most fa-
vored nation" status, which will allow Vietnam the same "duty,
or other import restriction or duty-free treatment proclaimed
in carrying out any trade agreement."1
78
VIII. ENDING THE EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
Vietnam's situation in dealing with the United States
parallels that of Cuba's on many levels. To begin, both coun-
tries share an adversarial history with the United States,
marked by comprehensive trade embargoes. Second, in the
20tl Century, both countries adopted Communism as their
national philosophy to the chagrin of the United States. The
United States viewed both countries as rife with opportunity
for investment and trade, yet took direct actions against their
acceptance of Communist ideology. Third, and most important-
ly, both countries relied heavily on the Soviet Union for eco-
nomic and military aid, so much so, that when the Soviet Un-
ion collapsed in the late 1980s, both countries once again be-
gan exploring capitalism and the flow of a free-market to boost
their economies. This section will explore and discuss ways
that the United States and Cuba could agree to disagree
philosophically and ideologically, yet renew and revitalize each
175. Id.
176. See Castelli, supra note 112, at 316.
177. See Tran-Trong, supra note 2, at 1594.
178. Id. at 1593-94; Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C §§ 2461-2466
(1994) (allowing the United States to grant tariff preferences to imports from cer-
tain countries).
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other's opportunities for investment and trade into the 21st
Century.
In 1994, after the fall of the Soviet Bloc, a participant at
the first "Base Parliamentary Assembly," nationwide "town
meetings" that were organized by Fidel Castro, stated:
Political and economic life in Cuba is undergoing certain
transformation. Pressed by the severing of its Soviet econom-
ic lifeline, the regime of Cuban President Fidel Castro has
come to the recognition that it can no longer remain isolated
from the global economy... The forces now at work in Cuba
have created an opportunity for the island's reemergence that
may be unprecedented since the Castro revolution nearly 35
years ago. 179
This attitude is reinforced by the Cuban Government's
actions over the last several years. In 1995, the Cuban Govern-
ment had entered into 212 joint ventures, forming partner-
ships with Spanish companies, Mexican investors, Canadian
firms, British companies, and Israeli vendors. 80 This was
seen as a clear shift away from the centrally planned economy
of a hard-line Communist ideology.''
Previously in Cuba, 80% of the total arable land, suitable
for farming, was in the state's hands; today, that number has
reversed, with 80% of farm land in the hands of farming coop-
eratives. 82 These agrarian reforms follow the model used in
Vietnam to transfer property from the state's control: coopera-
tives are allowed use of the land in return for 50% of the prof-
its." Cuban sugar exports are still one of the main revenue
producers for the economy.' One commentator has noted,
however, that the true "bottleneck" to Cuban recovery is
Cuba's lack of fuel.' In 1986, 98% of the 13 million tons of
179. See Philippi, supra note 30, at 317 (citing a translation of a participant at
the first Base Parliamentary Assembly, the Hospital Enrique Cabrera, Havana,
(Jan. 25, 1994)).
180. Ricardo Chavira, Weathering Economic Chaos: Castro's Grudging Reforms
Help Cuba Defy Predictions of Failure, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1995, at
1A
181. See Philippi, supra note 30, at 322.
182. Id. at 322-23.
183. Id. The Cuban government acknowledged that land previously operated by
the State at a loss, is now turning a profit. Id.
184. Id. at 323.
185. Id. at 324.
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oil used in Cuba was imported from the Soviet Union.'86 In
1992, however, imports dropped to less than two million tons
with Cuba's own domestic production for 1993 at slightly over
one million tons.'87 Though certainly an indication of the eco-
nomic problems that Cuba faces, it is not truly counter-indica-
tive of the growth that Cuba has enjoyed. The United States is
the only major country that is not investing in Cuba; Canada,
Mexico, the U.K, and other trading partners of the United
States openly invest and trade with Cuba. One scholar has
noted that the United States could become Cuba's largest trad-
ing partner in the region, once the sanctions have been lift-
ed. 8
8
For years, other major trading partners of the United
States have traded with Cuba; U.S. companies have even trad-
ed with Cuba through their foreign subsidiaries.189 Though
the United States has attempted to quell the influx of foreign
capital into Cuba from U.S trading partners, the efforts do not
appear to have been effective. 9 ' In fact, they have resulted in
alienation from, and tensions with, many of these same trad-
ing partners. 9' The United States should instead focus on
measures such as the "road map" strategy with Vietnam that
President Bush implemented to the success of both countries.
The embargo against Cuba is based on four major statutes,
and several steps are required before the President can lift the
embargo.19 The sanctions against Cuba under the TWEA are
imposed directly by the President; thus the President could lift
any sanctions governed by the TWEA unilaterally.93 The oth-
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, A ROAD MAP FOR RE-
STRUCTURING FUTURE U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA 19 (1995).
189. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90
Am. J. Int'l L. 419, 421 (1996).
190. This note does not explore the ramifications or the implications of the
Helms-Burton Act. Rather, Helms-Burton is yet another in a line of regulations
and statutes that the United States has implemented to buttress the existing
embargo. For an authoritative exploration of Helms-Burton, see Dhooge, supra note
145; Antonella Troia, Note, The Helms-Burton Controversy: An Examination of
Arguments That the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996 Violates U.S. Obligations Under NAFTA, 23 BROOK J. INTL L. 603 (1997).
191. See generally Dhooge, supra note 145.
192. See TWEA, supra note 59; FAA of 1961, supra note 56; CDA, supra note
148; and Helms-Burton, supra note 145.
193. See Casetelli, supra note 112, at 304.
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er statutes, however, could require action by both the Presi-
dent and the Congress."
To begin, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) does not ap-
pear to prohibit a President to unilaterally lift the embargo.
The FAA of 1961 was enacted by Congress and gave the Presi-
dent specific authority to impose a trade embargo against Cu-
ba, and like the TWEA, it follows that the President could
unilaterally lift any measures under the FAA.'95 However,
the legislation, when examined closely, shows that the Con-
gress intended for the United States to deny assistance to any
countries which remained under Communist rule.'96 This
would seem to indicate that the President would, at least, have
to make a report to Congress demonstrating that Cuba had
taken measures to hold elections with opportunity for partici-
pation by other political parties.
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA) was enacted by
Congress to promote a "peaceful transition to democracy in
Cuba." 9' The CDA covers "limitations on trade with coun-
tries that: (i) receive assistance from the former Soviet Union
(such as Cuba); and (ii) trade with Cuba (in the form of foreign
subsidiaries)."1 9 There is a "two-track" policy underlying
it. "'99 One track consists of the sanctions against Cuba. The
other track, reminiscent of Bush's Vietnam "road-map," is the
U.S. resolve to assist Cuba if it decides to take on a democratic
form of government."0 There are sections of the CDA that
require the President to report to Congress that Cuba has met
the conditions of the Act.2"' The Congress would need to re-
ceive notice of the President's intentions to lift the sanctions
under it.20 2 However, there is no provision in the CDA that
Congress could countermand the President if there was a dis-
agreement."'
194. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 2, at 85.
195. Id. at 66.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 69.
198. Id. at 69-70.
199. Id. at 70.
200. Id.
201. See Maria L. Pagan, U.S. Legal Requirements Affecting Trade with Cuba,
7 PACE INTL L. REV. 485, 501-02 (1995).
202. Id.
203. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 2, at 91.
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Finally, the most punitive measure regarding the Cuban
embargo is LIBERTAD. 2 °4 LIBERTAD is based on punitive
measures against foreign investors who "traffic" in expropriat-
ed property located in Cuba."5 The measures include the ex-
clusion from the United States of foreign investors who "par-
ticipate in the trafficking."0 6 The trafficking is defined as the
purchase of property from Cuba that Castro has confiscated in
the past thirty-eight years.0 7 To countermand the measures
set forth in LIBERTAD, the President would need to determine
that Cuba has a transition government in place, and then
report to the Congress on his determination before the Act
could be repealed."' Following a determination by the Presi-
dent that all statutory requirements have been met, an execu-
tive order could be issued instructing all the executive depart-
ments and agencies currently enforcing the embargo to begin
termination measures. 0 9
The obstacles that prevent a President from lifting the
embargo against Cuba arbitrarily would appear to be no more
than a facade of legislation.210 If the President determines
that it is prudent for the United States to once again open
trade relations with Cuba, then the President may, after the
appropriate reports to Congress, lift the embargo. 11 Of
course the American Congress has the power to override a
Presidential decree by a two-thirds majority, and it seems that
no President would take such a politically volatile step without
extensive consultation with, and acquiescence of, Congressional
leadership. 12 Given the normalization of relations with the
Communist leadership of Vietnam, America's reasons for im-
posing the embargo against Cuba can no longer be said to
hinge on the Communist ideology of Cuba's leadership. Rather,
204. See Helms-Burton, supra note 145.
205. Id. § 6091.
206. Id. § 6091(a).
207. Id.; Ann Devroy, Clinton to Tighten Sanctions on Cuba; Charter Flights
Halted, Legislation Backed, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27, 1996, at Al.
208. See Helms-Burton, supra note 145 at § 6085.
209. Id. § 6085. These agencies include, inter alia, the Departments of State
and the Treasury.
210. Closely examined, it appears that the President could circumvent Congres-
sional intent and mandates if the atmosphere of the tensions between the United
States' and Cuba were to change.
211. See generally Travieso-Diaz, supra note 2.
212. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.2.
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the final issue yet to be resolved, or discussed by the United
States and Cuba, surrounds the property claims resulting from
the expropriation of property during the Castro revolution.
As the statutory authority, specifically LIBERTAD, sug-
gests, the settlement of claims for property seized during the
beginning of Castro's rise to power are as yet unsettled.21
International law is made up of international custom and in-
ternational agreement.214 Only states consenting to such
agreements are bound by the agreements." 5 Accepted practic-
es among states, as well as international tribunal decisions,
can give rise to international custom.1 6 International law re-
quires a state to pay full compensation for "takings" of foreign
owned property.217 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States provides that a taking that
is discriminatory, not for a public purpose, and not accompa-
nied by "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is
unlawful.21 8 The United States maintains that the property
seized by Cuba was part of an expropriation program that dis-
criminated against U.S. nationals, was not for a public pur-
pose, and compensation that was to have been prompt, ade-
quate, and effective, has never been paid.219 Though there are
arguments from developing nations that "full" compensation
should be a relative term so as not to upset a developing econo-
213. See Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: .Post-Soviet
Lesson for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621, 623 (1996); MICHAEL W.
GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CUBA (1975).
214. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060 (1945). The first, second, and fourth sources of international law are: first,
"international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;" second, "international custom, as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law;" and fourth "judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsid-
iary means for the determination of rules of law." Id. arts. 38(1)(a), (b), (d).
215. Id. art. 38 (1)(a).
216. Id. art. 38 (1)(b).
217. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17.
218. Id.; Smagula, supra note 26, at 78.
219. See generally Smagula, supra note 26. There is debate among the interna-
tional community that the U.S. standard, "prompt, adequate, effective," is just
that-a U.S. standard. There is much evidence in international law, and custom
that uncompensated takings are illegal, and should be rectified-the debate is over
which standard will be applied. Id.; S.N. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal Law?, 55 AM. J. INTL. L. 863
(1961).
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my, international tribunals have held that full compensation is
the standard under international law.22
The issue of settling the property claims against Cuba
would seem to be as simple as Cuba signing an agreement
with the United States, much as Vietnam did, promising to
compensate the U.S. Government and its national claimants
what it owes them."' For Vietnam, the amount was U.S.
$208 million, in Cuba's case the amount is approximately U.S.
$13 billion.2 The amount of money owed by Cuba for the
takings brings about a dilemma for the United States. Cuba, in
its current economic state, would not be able to pay U.S. $13
billion; conversely, if the U.S. Government were to settle with
Cuba for an amount less than that owed, the U.S. Government
could be held liable to any of the over 5000 claimants to the
taken property for the difference.2"
The potential liability of the U.S. Government may be the
motivation that has kept the United States from negotiating a
settlement with Cuba. As Cuba's economy has continued to
grow, albeit at a slow pace, there appears to be little chance
that the United States could negotiate a one-time payment
from Cuba for what has continued to grow to well over U.S.
$13 billion. However, utilizing a carefully planned business
investment treaty, as well as a "road map" modeled on the
tactics used with Vietnam, the United States could approach
Cuba with a plan that would not only satisfy the claims for
taken property and avoid American liability and litigation with
the former property owners, but would sufficiently bolster the
Cuban economy so that full compensation could be paid over
time.
The U.S. statutes currently in place do not require full
220. See Smagula, supra note 26, at 83.
221. See Chanda, supra note 164.
222. See 1987 Foreign Claims Settlement Comm. Ann. Rep. 55. This figure is
the value of the property at the time of taking multiplied by the internationally
accepted standard of six percent interest compounded annually, as of 1995. See
Smagula, supra note 26, at 68.
223. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (holding that the
office of the President does have the power to "settle" claims against another coun-
try in the interest of settling an international dispute). But see Armstrong v. U.S.,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding the destruction of a property's value to its former
owner due to a federal government settlement with a foreign country leaves the
federal government liable to the former owners under the Fifth Amendment's
"Takings Clause").
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compensation for taken property before the embargo against
Cuba may be lifted.2" Phase one of the "road map" with Cu-
ba, therefore, would consist of the United States approaching
Cuba with a draft BIT,2  as well as indications that the em-
bargo will be lifted if certain steps are followed: Cuba will have
to facilitate a change in policy towards the United States and
indicate a willingness, by signing the BIT, to begin compensa-
tion for the taken property, as well as a willingness to consider
multi-party elections.
Phase two of the "road map" would consist of the partial
lifting of the embargo against Cuba by having the United
States alleviate travel restrictions, and open telecommunica-
tions lines and services with Cuba. This would begin to fuel
the Cuban tourism economy, and would allow Cuba to begin
updating its obsolete communications technology systems.226
Conversely, Cuba would begin payments into a central com-
pensation fund of a set amount per year, to be determined by
the two governments. These payments would be compensation
for any properties that Cuba is unwilling, or unable to restore,
to the former owners. Cuba would also have to hold free elec-
tions with at least one other viable political party other than
the Communist party.
Phase three, the final phase, would consist of the transi-
tion of Cuba's Government from a one party oligarchy to a
freely elected ruling body. The United States would then lift all
trade restrictions against Cuba, as per the BIT. The influx of
trade from the United States would strengthen Cuba's econo-
my sufficiently so that the graduated repayments to former
owners of property in Cuba would compensate them for their
losses, and the U.S. Government would not be liable for any
losses.
224. See TWEA, supra note 59; FAA of 1961, supra note 56; CDA, supra note
148; and Helms-Burton, supra note 145.
225. Bilateral investment treaties protect U.S. interests in foreign investment
agreements with other countries, specifically containing "explicit provisions that
ensure compensation for expropriated property." Smagula, supra note 26, at 86;
Kathleen Kunzer, Developing a Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 15 L. & POL'Y
INTL Bus. 273, 273 (1983).
226. As of 1993, there were 21 telephones per 1,000 persons. KCWD, supra
note 14.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the resolution presented above takes a sim-
plistic view of the diplomatic and political processes necessary
before the steps to lifting the Cuban embargo are taken by
either nation. There is no discussion of the anti-Castro lobby in
the United States and the ramifications faced by politicians
who appear to support the normalization of relations with
Cuba. There also is not a discussion of Castro's repeated state-
ments regarding his refusals to "deal" with the United States.
The reason for censoring the debate in this way is not to water
down issues that are politically important to both sides, but
rather to present an argument in the context of hindsight,
looking at the relations between the United States and Viet-
nam without the seemingly requisite accompanying political
rhetoric.
At roughly the same time that Cuba became a Communist
state, the United States and Vietnam began a military conflict
that resulted in the loss of thousands of lives on both sides.
Two decades later both countries were able to begin to work
out their differences in the best long-term business and invest-
ment interests of each. Cuba and the United States, two coun-
tries who have only waged a war of words, are urged to do the
same.
David Mowry
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